The RTG campaign scenario is great for solitaire play due to the delayed arrival of the Army of the Potomac (AoP). Until that time, the Confederates move virtually unchallenged through Pennsylvania racking up points.

Let's consider a game where the AoP arrives on the map as late as possible, i.e. July 2 (Turn 10). This comes from result "D" on the "July 1" column of the arrival table (1st increment, following day). This late arrival means that the Confederates need to score 20 additional points for each level of victory:

VP table
as written
late arriving
70 90 marginal
85 105 substantive
100 120 decisive

Where are all the Confederate points going to come from?

Low-hanging fruit:

  • 10 pts for surrender of all "HF" units (half of 19 manpower)
  • 12 pts for six 2-point levies
  • 5 pts for five 1-point levies
  • 6 pts for levy of York

33 points

  • A levy of Harrisburg is not as easy, but if accomplished yields 12 points.

45 points

  • There are 25 manpower points in the PA militia, but the CSA can't count on all 25 as VP. Some will retreat off the map, and the CSA may lose manpower in the process. Let's say a net gain of 15 points?

60 points

  • Confederates cannot enter central Maryland until the AOP arrives. This opens up 14 points worth of B&O RR stations to destroy (but requiring infantry, since cavalry can only cause damage).

74 points - still 16 short of a marginal victory (if the AoP arrives late).

County control will be the determining factor.

  • Adams (25), Frederick-West (28), or York (30): marginal @ 99, 102, or 104 points
  • Frederick-East (40): substantive @ 114 points
  • Carroll (50), Baltimore (60), or Howard (70): decisive @ 124, 134, or 144 points

Let's now assume that President Lincoln has ordered the AoP into defensive positions around Washington and it never arrives on the RTG map! This is not permitted by the AoP deployment rules, but may have been an option historically - call it "Lincoln Command Paralysis" or "Protect Washington above all else."

Confederate units (in this event) are never allowed entry to central Maryland (per scenario rule), which means none of the B&O RR stations will be destroyed. We're back on 60 points, with only York and Adams counties eligible for CSA control.

  • Adams: 25 + 60 = 85
  • York: 30 + 60 = 90

Just short of (or barely squeaking by with) a 90-point CSA marginal victory, even after all that marching, levying, HF garrison capturing, and PA militia mauling!

Arrival of the AoP

OK. Back to the rules as written. The AoP must arrive on the map at some point. The problem is that they arrive on the south edge of the map, and must march through Maryland at their 1862 snail's pace. But in June 1863 the Army of the Potomac was a completely different animal. The long marches of the AoP in late June were quite amazing.

Take for example the 6th Corps:

On Saturday [June 27], they marched 12 miles from the Potomac river to Poolesville, then camped for the night. That was just a warm-up, though, for the 63 miles they’d cover over the next three days:

  • 18 miles from Poolesville to Hyattstown
  • 22 from Hyattstown to New Windsor
  • 23 miles from New Windsor to Manchester.

A day of rest on July 1, then at dusk came an urgent order to proceed to Gettysburg: By the shortest route, from Manchester south to Westminster, then west down the Baltimore Turnpike through Union Mills and Littlestown to Gettysburg, the corps would have to cover 38 miles. And they would have to be there by midday on Thursday [July 2].

In five long marches (June 27, 28, 29, 30, and overnight July 1-2) the 6th Corps marched 113 miles!

Every corps of the AoP achieved similar prodigious marches during the advance. Never before (and not again, until the pursuit from Petersburg to Appomattox) did the AoP march so far, so fast.

In 1862, the AoP averaged something like 6 miles a day. Suddenly they are marching 20 miles plus per day. This rapid advance had a huge impact on Lee's conduct of battle and our understanding of his decisions. Lee could not believe that the entire AoP was on the field by July 3, therefore...Picket's Charge? Also, let's not place so much blame on Stuart for his "late" arrival at Gettysburg: Stuart was not late...the AoP was early!

These long marches in Maryland are impossible under GCACW movement rules, even with the "bonus cycles" permitted by campaign rule 6.0.

Historically the AoP was in northen Maryland on July 1. Since the Confederate infantry can't enter central Maryland until the AoP arrives they will offer no interference if we simply allow the AoP's three increments to setup directly in northern Maryland.

Ignore rule 6.0. Instead, place the entire Army of the Potomac directly on the map in the arrival phase of July 1st (Turn 9).

  • Place all arriving units on road or pike hexes in Maryland, east of the Catoctin Mountains.
  • Infantry and artillery units may not stack; cavalry and leaders may.
  • Infantry units must each setup adjacent to another unit of the same corps.
  • 1st increment: within 4 hexes of the Pennsylvania border.
  • 2nd increment: 5 to 8 hexes from the Pennsylvania border.
  • 3rd increment: 9 to 12 hexes from the Pennsylvania border.
  • There are no CSA victory points lost in connection with the AoP arrival.
  • All units arrive at F0 and unexhausted.

With this new arrival method, the victory points tallied above (85 and 90 points - for Adams and York counties respectively, plus all other available VP's) put the CSA near (or within) the substantive victory range. This seems reasonable for an unopposed Confederate pillaging of Pennsylvania. The Union is therefore forced to be proactive in response.